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The squalid labyrinth that is Sadr City has long had a fearsome reputation among U.S. soldiers. A slum-metropolis of low concrete buildings and apartment blocks within Baghdad, with streets full of trash and excrement, a maze of alleyways, and a largely hostile population of more than 2 million Shiites who have been radicalized by their anti-American patron, Moktada al-Sadr, the neighborhood represents a worst-case scenario in urban warfare.

After a fierce firefight there in April 2004 between the Army's 1st Cavalry Division and militias allied to Sadr, the U.S. military has largely steered clear of Sadr City. Even when 30,000 troops "surged" to Iraq last year specifically to secure Baghdad, Sadr City and its Jaish al-Mahdi militia were notably exempted from the offensive. That's one reason the current protracted battle by U.S. and Iraqi forces to secure a section of Sadr City is so notable. That fighting accounts for most of the 49 U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq in April, the highest casualty total in seven months.

The battle for Sadr City may be decisive, and it could signify a new phase of the Iraq war. The outcome will reveal important information about the readiness of the Iraqi Security Force to take the lead in a difficult counterinsurgency operation, albeit with significant U.S. support, a model on which the future of Iraq could eventually hinge. The fighting will also speak to the relative strength of Moktada al-Sadr and his militia, a question that has gone unanswered in the uneasy cease-fire that he declared a year ago.

As the recent high-ranking delegation of Iraqi officials to Tehran attests, the battle for Sadr City is also likely to further expose Iran's hidden hand in arming and resupplying Shiite militias in Iraq, and perhaps shed light on the Iranians' determination to keep doing so in the face of concerted Iraqi and U.S. pressure. Finally, and perhaps most important, the battle for Sadr City will test the willingness of fractious and sectarian Iraqi politicians to back the central government and the leadership of Shiite Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki through what could be weeks and even months of fighting.

"The operation to eliminate the criminal element that controls Sadr City is an entirely Iraqi-developed plan, and it probably represents the biggest political chance that Maliki has taken since assuming office," a U.S. general familiar with the Sadr City battle plan said.

"I think the ISF is large and professional enough now that they can be successful in Sadr City with our help," the general said, "providing they stick to a counterinsurgency doctrine of clearing, holding, and reconstructing neighborhoods in a way that undermines JAM's support among the local population." True success may ultimately depend, he said, on whether the Iraqi government can sustain the political will to keep fighting. "So far, we've seen more Iraqi nationalism galvanize around Maliki than ever before," the officer said. "So I don't think a lot of people have grasped just how significant this battle is. As a political leader, Maliki has really stuck his neck out--but in the right direction."

If the Maliki government is unsuccessful, however, and Iraqi security forces are forced to back down in Sadr City in the face of stiff militia resistance and determined Iranian interference, it could also represent a profound setback for the entire Iraq enterprise. In that sense, the timing of this battle could hardly be more sensitive, with a U.S. decision on further troop withdrawals expected this summer, provincial Iraqi elections looming in the fall, and an American body politic looking daily for signs that the Iraqis are ready to assume more of the burden of their own security.

"In talking to a number of U.S. officials on the ground in Iraq, I sense a lot of nervousness," said Michael O'Hanlon, a national security expert who compiles the Iraq Index--a measurement of progress in the war--at the Brookings Institution. "How the operation in Sadr City plays out could prove critically important, because success could bring huge benefits. At the same time, it is distinctly possible that it could spark a general rebellion by the entire Sadrist movement, which would be very negative. Right now, the situation in Sadr City is too confusing to know in which of those directions events are heading."

The battle for Sadr City is a direct outgrowth of the March campaign by Iraqi security forces to take control of the southern port city of Basra from a collection of Shiite militias (including Sadr's) and criminal gangs. Maliki traveled to Basra to personally oversee that hastily planned operation, which took even U.S. officials by surprise. The media largely depicted the Basra fighting as ending in a stalemate and cease-fire between the Iraqi military and the Sadr militia.

U.S. officials in Iraq, however, paint a far different picture. The fighting in Basra ended not when the two sides fought to a draw, they say, but when Sadr unilaterally backed down. In the intervening weeks, Iraqi security forces have continued to exert greater control over Basra and the adjacent port of Umm Qasr, the hub responsible for most Iraqi oil exports.

"My understanding is that the Sadrists tried to negotiate a joint statement with the government of Iraq, and the government said no, so [the Sadrists] just went ahead and put out a [cease-fire] statement under the name of Moktada al-Sadr," said Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, in a recent talk with reporters. "So there wasn't a negotiated cease-fire, and indeed, Iraqi Security Force operations continued in Basra as well as Sadr City."

Whether Maliki launched the Basra offensive out of a narrow desire to weaken Sadr as a political rival in anticipation of elections this fall, from a nationalist determination to exert government control over a lawless and crucial city, or from a mixture of motivations, close observers say that the Iraqi leader emerged from the experience emboldened.

The discovery of numerous caches of Iranian arms--and intelligence indicating that Iran's Quds Force continued to resupply Shiite militias in Basra even in the midst of the fighting--apparently opened Maliki's eyes to the degree of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs, leading to the high-level delegation to Tehran. A marked increase in the number of rocket and mortar attacks on Baghdad's Green Zone by Iranian-backed "special groups" based in Sadr City, apparently in hopes of relieving pressure on their fellow militia members in Basra, also seems to have convinced Maliki that his government could no longer countenance a militia sanctuary within the capital.

"Basra wasn't exactly a textbook, West Point-planned operation, but Maliki showed bold leadership, and with each phase of the operation we observed that Iraqi security forces got better," Rear Adm. Patrick Driscoll, spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, said in a telephone interview from Baghdad. "With that demonstrated capability in Basra, the Iraqi government got more confident, and they looked at Sadr City and saw a very similar problem: a lawless area run by criminal gangs who extort people and fire rockets at the seat of power every day in order to demonstrate that the Iraqi government is weak. And Maliki said, 'We have to get it under control.' I've been struck by the firmness of his attitude on the need to establish the rule of law in Sadr City."

To date the operation has closely followed the "clear, hold, build" counterinsurgency template laid out by the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus. It began with construction of a security barrier to wall off the southeastern section of Sadr City nearest the Green Zone. Once in place, the barrier will offer protection against sniper fire, and will funnel traffic through checkpoints to control the smuggling of rockets into the area. U.S. and Iraqi forces have established a joint security station in southeastern Sadr City, and the Iraqi government has earmarked $250 million in reconstruction funds to win the support of the local population.

"After targeting Sadr's forces in Basra, Maliki may not have had much choice but to take them on in the stronghold of Sadr City," said Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Certainly if the government gains moderate control over Basra and pushes Sadr's militia to the sidelines in Sadr City--two very big "ifs"--that will represent a significant turn of events, Cordesman says. "But that's the problem with turning points. They happen, but generally you only see them in hindsight."