April 22, 2025, 3:55 p.m.
Discussion of faith’s relationship to politics often begins and ends with voting patterns among religious groups. But the societal and political impacts of religion run far broader and deeper than the exit polling.
The U.S. Constitution sets up religious freedom via the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. That principle lives in tension with the fact that religion guides how people want to live in a society together—which affects everything that the government does. Coverage of Pope Francis’s death is a case in point: Within a few minutes of his passing, you were likely to hear him identified as “progressive” and hear about how he weighed in on political issues in the U.S.
Granted, the Catholic Church is unique in its stature. It has been at least as much of a political institution as a religious one for the last 1,500 years. But few religious entities are apolitical, and in the U.S. religion and politics are inextricably tied together, along with language, beliefs, and symbolism. The very reason many colonists came to the U.S. was to practice their religion.
The country’s population was fairly homogeneously Christian for much of its history, but that has shifted in recent decades. The American public has somewhat secularized, with more than a quarter now saying they do not have any religion at all. For a while, it seemed as though the secularization trend would continue—but recent studies show considerable shifting in religious life, which clearly correlates with political patterns that emerged in 2024.
Since the 1970s and the “Religious Right” movement, conservative Christianity has been the dominant religious force in politics. The emergence of what was once referred to as the “Moral Majority” dominated Republican politics for decades—sometimes behind the scenes, and sometimes loudly.
The coalition sent its voters to Republicans in exchange for favorable policies, particularly on religious and cultural issues. They claimed the mantle of “family values” and waged campaigns based on candidates’ “character,” on which they believed any Republican could win against any Democrat. They pushed electing Republicans who would nominate conservative judges with the end goal of overturning Roe v. Wade. They succeeded, but they had to sell out on morals first to help elect President Trump.
Underneath their embrace of Trump was an inconvenient truth: White evangelicals were declining as a proportion of the population, as younger generations didn’t adopt the religiosity of their parents. In 2007, 78 percent of Americans were Christian. By 2019, that had dropped to 63 percent, where it has remained since, with the religiously unaffiliated share growing from 16 percent to 29 percent. White evangelicals went from 23 percent of the population in 2007 to 13 percent in 2023.
Despite this trend, the Republican coalition remains mostly unchanged. In 2013, 10 percent of Republicans were religiously unaffiliated; by 2023, that figure was 12 percent. Thirty-four percent of the coalition was white evangelical in 2013, which only dropped slightly to 30 percent in 2023.
Most of the religiously unaffiliated lean Democratic, growing from 22 percent of partisans in 2013 to 33 percent in 2023—but that still leaves two-thirds of Democrats who affiliate with a religion. Only 10 percent of Democrats are non-Christian religious, leaving a 57 percent majority that is Christian, despite the widespread belief that Democrats are not religious.
The religious trends are shifting again, though. The decline of Christian affiliation has slowed, as has the corresponding increase in those completely religiously unaffiliated. The New York Times hypothesizes that perhaps people are returning because they didn’t find a suitable alternative. Young men are coming back to religion, although young women are not. Not coincidentally, young men shifted toward Republicans in 2024. The population overall shifted toward Republicans in 2024.
It’s difficult to nail down which branches of Christianity are growing and which are not. Some evidence points to more-liberal denominations losing members, sometimes as a result of schisms over LGBTQ issues. The Catholic Church in the U.S. seems to be getting more conservative by voting habits and clergy affiliation.
Notice that all of the discussion about church direction and schisms is framed in political terms. Is it that we just don’t know how else to describe it, or is it really always political?
David French offers a nonpolitical distinction: Did you grow up in “a church that fears the world or loves its neighbors?” The simple frame aptly describes two approaches to Christianity: one that focuses internally on one’s own religious community and fearing God, and another that focuses externally on serving the outside world. Isn’t that the fundamental distinction between liberal and conservative, too? One protects the self and immediate community, while the other spreads outward.
It’s all political.
